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A recent profile piece in the Financial Times highlighted the breadth of  Amia Srinivasan’s 
thought. It is not surprising, then, that the new Chichele Professor of  Social and Political 
Theory at Oxford has written one of  the most interesting recent papers in epistemology. It’s 
also a sign that philosophy in the analytic tradition is beginning to recognise the central 
importance of  political theory for epistemology; something that has long been known in, for 
instance, the Black feminist tradition. Srinivasan’s ‘Radical Externalism’ is published in The 
Philosophical Review. It gives an argument for what epistemologists’s call an externalist account 
of  justified belief; and it tries to explain why such an account might be what epistemologists 
call normative. But we’ll come to all of  that. Let me begin by setting the scene. 
The first philosophical idea I ever encountered was a sceptical challenge. It was on a 
television show when I was a teenager; Blackadder, I think, though I’ve never been able to track 
it down again. Here it is. You think the world has existed for many years. You think your 
memories of  the past are accurate, and the traces of  the past you see in the world around you 
are genuine. But how can you tell that the world was not created only a few seconds ago, 
along with you and your apparent memories and all the other misleading evidence of  its great 
age? How could you ever rule out that possibility? And how could you justify your belief  if  
your couldn’t rule it out? 
That was my first experience of  philosophy. Gradually, I came to realise that this was just one 
sceptical challenge among many. Here’s another: You think that your friends and family and 
other people you meet have conscious minds just like your own. You believe that they think 
like you, experience pain and sadness and love just like you. But how can you tell that they 
aren’t sophisticated robots with no conscious experience at all, trained to simulate human 
behaviour flawlessly? What evidence could you ever collect that would allow you to dismiss 
that possibility? 
In both cases, the sceptical challenge has the same structure. You have a particular belief  (the 
world’s old; my friends have minds). The sceptic describes a hypothetical scenario in which 
everything would seem to you exactly as it actually seems, and yet the world beyond your 
mind would be dramatically different, and the belief  you have about it would be false (the 
world’s very young, but it was created with apparent evidence of  the past and your memories; 
your friends have no minds, but can simulate human behaviour perfectly). You are then 
invited to justify believing that the world is the way you think it is, rather than the way it is in 
the sceptical scenario. And you find that you have no resources to draw on; everything you 
might use would be exactly the same in the sceptical scenario. 
That’s the sceptical challenge, and it puzzled me on and off  during my teenage years. What 
could break the symmetry between my belief  and the sceptical hypothesis? Answer: nothing 
to which I have access. After all, in each case, the sceptical hypothesis is designed specifically 
to ensure that, were it true, my evidence, my memories, and anything else accessible to me 
would be exactly as it actually is. Perhaps, then, it is some intrinsic feature of  my belief  or the 
sceptical hypothesis that could tell between them. Perhaps I could argue that my belief  is 
simply more plausible? But what makes it so? Is it that it’s a simpler or more elegant 
explanation of  the things I experience? For one thing, it’s not clear that it is either of  those 
things; and for another, it’s not clear why it would be relevant if  it were. Sceptical challenges 
are hard to answer. 
When I studied philosophy as an undergraduate, however, I learned that there was a very 
straightforward answer to these challenges. It’s called externalism. According to the 
externalist, the sceptical challenge looks unsolvable only because we’ve been in thrall to 
internalism, a faulty account of  when a belief  is justified. According to internalism, or at least 
the version known as access internalism, whether or not your belief  is justified depends only 
on what’s going on in your mind, and in particular the part of  your mind to which you have 
conscious access. The idea, roughly speaking, is that a belief  is justified if  the person holding 
it can justify that belief  using what’s available to them. For the internalist, then, the sceptical 
challenge is difficult to answer because everything that is available to you would be the same 
in the sceptical scenario; so it seems impossible to adduce any of  it as evidence against the 
sceptical hypothesis. 
According to externalism, on the other hand, whether or not your belief  is justified typically 
depends not only on what’s going on in your mind, but also what’s going on in the world 
beyond your mind, and the relationship between your mind and that external world. Thus, 
for instance, some externalists will say that a belief  is justified if  the process that led you to 
form it is highly reliable; that is, it produces a high proportion of  true beliefs and a low 
proportion of  false beliefs. For instance, for a sighted person, a belief  about a nearby, 
reasonably large object formed on the basis of  their visual experience will count as justified 
because that process is highly reliable: while a typical visual system can lead us astray, 
particularly in the case of  visual illusions, it delivers true beliefs very often and false ones 
relatively rarely. 
One of  the central arguments in favour of  externalism has always been that it provides a 
compelling response to the sceptical challenge. According to the externalist, what breaks the 
symmetry between your belief  that the world is old and the evidence of  its age veridical, on 
the one hand, and the sceptical hypothesis that the world is very young and the evidence of  its 
age misleading, on the other, is that, in the world we actually inhabit, which is old and 
contains veridical evidence, the process by which you form your belief  about its age is highly 
reliable. You see the evidence of  the age of  the universe using your visual system, or you draw 
it from your memory; you collect together that evidence; and you infer from it all that the 
universe has existed for longer than the last couple of  seconds. Each step in this process is 
reliable: your visual system reliably forms true beliefs; so does your memory; and, in this 
world that we actually inhabit, extrapolating from evidence in the way you do is also a reliable 
process. According to the externalist, then, your belief  is justified and the sceptical challenge 
is answered. 
Against this triumph for the externalist, the internalist often pits a series of  hypothetical cases 
where the externalist seems to get things wrong. Consider Jaya. Entirely unbeknownst to her, 
Jaya is blessed with a remarkably reliable ability to tell a fake Leonardo painting from a real 
one. Almost however good the fake is, she will be able to spot it. But she’s never used this 
ability before and she has no idea that she has it. One day in a museum, standing in front of  a 
painting that the gallery attributes to Leonardo, this ability leads Jaya to form a strong belief  
that the painting is a fake. She doesn’t know where that belief  came from, nor what features 
of  the painting led her to conclude that. Five years later, experts verify that the painting is 
indeed a 19th century forgery. According to externalism, Jaya’s belief  was not only true, it was 
justified, because it was formed by a reliable mechanism. For many people, this is the wrong 
verdict. Jaya was right, but she could give no justification for her belief, and indeed she wasn’t 
even aware of  the basis for it, let alone why the basis provided support to the belief. So it 
wasn’t justified. So externalism gives false positives: there are unjustified beliefs it considers 
justified. 
Another riposte to the externalist points to its false negatives. Think about a world where one 
of  the sceptical hypotheses is true. The world really did come into existence two minutes ago, 
complete with me, my memories, and all the signs that it’s older than it really is. Surely then I 
would still be justified in believing that it was old. After all, I’d have all the same evidence! But 
the externalist will typically have to deny this. So there are unjustified beliefs it considers 
unjustified.  
So much for the scene-setting. We’ve met internalism and externalism now. We’ve seen why 
internalism finds it hard to answer the sceptical challenge, why the externalist finds it easy, 
and why that latter victory comes at the high cost of  false positives and false negatives. Let’s 
turn now to Srinivasan’s article. In it, she notes a different sort of  sceptical challenge that 
externalism can meet. This challenge is even more powerful than the traditional one, so 
externalism’s achievement is all the greater and the argument in its favour all the stronger. 
In the standard sceptical cases, there are two hypotheses, the one you believe and the sceptical 
one that your interlocutor uses to argue that your belief  isn’t justified. Your evidence seems 
not to tell in favour of  either, but we want to say that your belief  is in fact justified. In the sorts 
of  case Srinivasan has in mind, there are again two hypotheses, the one you believe and the 
sceptical one. But in this case your evidence seems to tell positively in favour of  the sceptical 
one. Yet we want to say that your belief  is justified. This is clearly a harder challenge, but, as 
Srinivasan notes, externalism is up to the task. 
Srinivasan is thinking of  cases in which an individual comes to recognise an aspect of  their 
oppression or identifies an instance of  prejudice, group-based hatred or mistreatment, or 
discrimination. A working class academic at an Oxford college who hears comments from 
their colleagues, rightly concludes that the institution is classist, and retains their belief  even 
when the Principal of  the college, also from a working class background, assures them that 
they have misinterpreted the comments. A woman working on a production line who rightly 
interprets the behaviour of  a male colleague as sexual harassment and retains that judgment 
in the face of  pressure from a misogynist society that consistently downplays such claims and 
dismisses them as neurotic overreactions or fabrications. A person of  colour who interprets 
the media coverage of  a Black celebrity as racial hatred, and who retains her confidence in 
that reading even as influential media figures, many of  whom she usually trusts, bellow that 
it’s all been blown out of  proportion. 
Very often, Srinivasan contends, we wish to say that an individual is justified in ignoring the 
vast body of  countervailing testimonial evidence that threatens to gaslight them in these cases. 
She claims that they are justified in retaining their belief  in the face of  that powerful evidence. 
But of  course the internalist will often have to say that they are not justified, for the 
countervailing evidence against their belief  seems much stronger to them from the inside than 
the original evidence for their belief. As we’ll discuss more below, that is precisely why 
gaslighting is so effective and so insidious. The externalist, on the other hand, can say that 
they are justified, since we can see from the outside that the way they produced that belief  is 
in fact reliable; the belief  stood in the right sort of  relationship to the part of  the world that it 
concerned. In the classist, racist, misogynist society such an individual inhabits, such 
countervailing gaslighting evidence is typically misleading, while their own ability to detect 
classism, misogyny, and racism is reliable. So, just as in the original sceptical cases, the 
externalist’s verdicts about justification square with our favoured ones. 
As with the externalist solution to the traditional sceptical problems at the beginning, there 
are of  course internalist objections. Consider, for instance, Charlie. They stand in an art 
gallery, looking at a painting that appears to them entirely red. They are told by the gallery 
curator that it is in fact a white canvas, but lit by red light. Nevertheless, Charlie persists in 
their belief, and in fact they turn out to be correct. Though typically an honest individual, the 
gallery curator was lying. Is Charlie’s belief  justified? The externalist will typically have to say 
that it is. Yet many people feel this is the wrong answer. It is another false positive for the 
externalist. Perhaps they have only managed to defeat the sceptic by making it too easy for a 
belief  to count as justified. 
At this point, we seem to have reached a stalemate. There are cases that the externalist seems 
to get right: they save us from traditional forms of  scepticism; and they render justified 
individuals who reliably detect instances of  oppression and prejudice. And there are cases that 
the internalist seems to get right: Jaya and her uncanny eye for a Leonardo fake; and Charlie’s 
use of  standard visual perception to detect the colour of  a surface. How can we tell between 
them? 
Philosophers differ on how we should adjudicate these disputes. For some, we should cleave as 
closely as possible to the data we collect. That is, we should present these cases to a large and 
diverse sample of  people, collect their responses, and choose whichever account best fits the 
evidence. We might call this the empiricist approach. For others, our concepts are not some 
fixed feature of  the world that we must discover by polling users. They are malleable, and it is 
part of  our role as philosophers to recommend how they should be used. We might make 
these recommendations based on the general practical benefits that we anticipate accruing 
from using the concept in one way or the other. We might call this the pragmatist approach. 
Or we might follow Sally Haslanger and make these recommendations based on the political 
usefulness of  the concept. We might call this the ameliorative approach. 
The empiricist approach is likely to end either in stalemate, or in an extraordinarily complex 
concept, boasting myriad epicycles, designed to fit the contours of  the data. And while we’ve 
seen Srinivasan argue that there are practical and indeed political reasons to use the 
externalist version of  the concept, we have not yet considered whether there might be equally 
strong or stronger practical or political reasons to use the internalist notion. 
However, all of  this assumes that there are just two options: adopt the internalist concept and 
eschew the externalist one; or use the externalist concept and reject the internalist one. But 
perhaps there is a third option: accept both. For the empiricist, this would mean concluding 
that the term is ambiguous between two concepts. For the pragmatist and the ameliorative 
approach, it would mean that there’s practical or political value in dividing the concept in two 
and retaining both halves. 
For the empiricist, it seems plausible to draw this conclusion from the stalemate. After all, this 
is what philosophers have done in other cases. Suppose I take a coin out of  my pocket and tell 
you it is a trick coin, biased either towards landing heads or biased towards landing tails. You 
say the coin is just as likely to land heads as to land tails. Are you right? Many will say yes, and 
many will say no. Another stalemate. In this case, we resolve the standoff  by saying that there 
are two concepts of  probability in play. The first is epistemic, the other ontic. The first 
measures something like your degree of  confidence, and on that concept, it is right to say that 
the coin is equally likely to land heads or tails, for my confidence in each outcome is the same. 
The second measures something about the world independent of  our knowledge of  it, and on 
that concept, it is not just as likely to land as tails. Indeed, it is either biased towards heads in 
which case it is more likely to land heads than tails, or it is biased towards tails in which case it 
is more likely to land that way than the other. These two versions of  the concept of  
probability have been distinguished and even given their own names: credence for the 
epistemic concept and chance for its ontic cousin. 
And indeed there are other examples: when a thirsty person holds a glass of  poison that they 
mistakenly believe to be harmless water, we say that they have internal reasons for drinking it 
but external reasons to refrain. We allow the concepts of  internal and external reasons to co-
exist, because we recognise that both concepts are useful, and a conceptual scheme that 
welcomes both might be more cluttered than one that accommodates only one of  them, but it 
more than compensates for that by yielding us greater expressive power. 
Indeed, it’s worth noting that philosophers have already divided the very concept of  
justification, though in a different way from the one that is proposed here. If  I have evidence 
for a belief, but I’ve formed the belief  not on the basis of  that evidence but on the basis of  
wishful thinking, for instance, we say that my belief  is propositionally justified but not 
doxastically justified. So we already countenance different versions of  justification. Why not 
also countenance internal and external versions? 
In sum: there are certainly precedents for splitting a concept in two when the pursuit of  a 
precise account of  the single concept end in a stalemate. From Srinivasan, we have seen the 
practical and political import of  retaining the externalist version of  the concept of  
justification. But what of  the internalist version? 
As is often noted, one practical use of  the concept is in legal settings. In many cases, whether 
a person should be found guilty of  a crime depends on whether they were justified in 
believing that they were doing no harm. Think again of  the person holding a glass of  poison 
that they believe to be water. They offer their friend a drink, which kills them. Are they guilty 
of  any crime? The question often turns on whether their belief  that the glass contained only 
water was justified, where that concept is used in the internalist sense. 
Such an argument might not convince Srinivasan, though, who agrees with Marx that 
excessive concern with assigning blame is a bourgeois preoccupation. I tend to agree. But I 
don’t think it requires excessive concern to think that it would be useful to have an epistemic 
concept that we can use to make such ascriptions. If  we must choose between only using the 
internalist concept or only using the externalist concept, then it does perhaps show excessive 
concern with blameworthiness to insist on the concept that supports such judgments. But if  
we can choose both, and we choose to include the internalist concept for this reason, it 
doesn’t. 
What’s more, the appeal of  the internalist concept is not restricted to its role in assigning 
blame. We also use it to signal that a person’s beliefs or actions are internally coherent or 
rationally comprehensible, and that is useful because it allows us to predict their future 
behaviour. If  I see someone behave in a way that is incomprehensible to me, but learn that 
they are internally justified in doing so, I learn that they must have beliefs that support or 
rationalise that behaviour, and that allows me to predict how they will behave in other 
situations. One weakness of  the externalist concept is that learning that someone’s belief  is 
justified tells us little about the rest of  their cognitive states. It tells us only about the 
relationship between that belief  and the part of  the world that it concerns.  
So there are pragmatic benefits to including the internalist concept of  justification that go 
beyond its use in assigning blame. But these are not specifically political benefits to weigh 
against those catalogued by Srinivasan for the externalist concept. To see that there are those 
sorts of  benefits too, we need look no further than the sort of  case that Srinivasan herself  
considers. 
In each of  the cases we described above—the classist Oxford college, the sexual harassment 
of  a woman in the workplace, and the racist coverage of  a Black celebrity—the individual 
who has identified these phenomena is gaslighted by society as a whole. That is, the collective 
beliefs and attitudes of  the society they inhabit bombard them with powerful but misleading 
evidence that threatens to undermine their belief  in their own ability to discover certain sorts 
of  truths about the world, and thereby threatens to undermine their beliefs in those truths. 
They are told that what seems to them good evidence of  oppression or prejudice is in fact not 
good evidence; they are told that their reaction to it is out of  proportion to the evidence they 
have; and they are told this often and by many people whose judgments they trust in other 
spheres. As Srinivasan points out, we want to say that those who resist such gaslighting are 
justified in doing so. And the externalist is best equipped to deliver that judgment. However, 
in order to understand just what is so insidious about gaslighting, we need to appeal to the 
internalist notion of  justification as well. Let’s see why. 
Note that, while Srinivasan is right to say that there’s a sense in which the person who resists 
gaslighting is justified in their belief, there is also a sense in which the person who does not 
resist is also justified, for they believe in line with the evidence that they possess. And it is 
important to have a concept that recognises this fact not only so that we don’t blame victims 
of  gaslighting for their failure to resist, but also because it allows us to see how gaslighting 
differs from other sorts of  harmful epistemic practices. Some politically repressive epistemic 
practices appeal to our rationality and others to our irrationality. Gaslighting is in the former 
camp. The goal of  gaslighting is to make you doubt something you formerly believed: that a 
particular interaction counted as sexual harassment or rape; that a comment was racist or 
classist or homophobic. It achieves that goal by bombarding you with evidence to which the 
rational response is to drop your belief. After all, according to most, when you find out that 
nearly everyone disagrees with you on a topic about which you take yourself  to be no more o 
an expert than them, the rational move—or perhaps just a rational move—is to drop your 
belief  on that topic, even if  you don’t wholeheartedly take up the opposing majority belief. 
This is very different from a harmful epistemic practice that appeals to our cognitive biases, 
for instance. Suppose I try to make you drop your belief  that Nadiya is a competent algebraic 
topologist by reminding you of  certain features of  her that your implicit biases associate with 
a lack of  mathematical competence. I’ve deployed a very different sort of  epistemic weapon 
against your beliefs here. And, from a political point of  view, this is important because the 
way we must defend against these weapons will be rather different. In the latter sort of  case, 
we seek to remedy a problem with the way you think; in the former, we seek to remedy the 
sort of  evidence you’re receiving; and it’s not hard to see that different policies might serve 
those different ends. 
That’s one political reason for retaining the internalist notion of  justification along with its 
externalist cousin. To see another, it’s useful to note how positively valenced normative 
concepts—like rationality, justification, and knowledge—work in epistemology. Most often, 
they apply to whatever doxastic item it is that they concern—beliefs, or the mechanisms by 
which they’re formed, or social institutions for the dissemination of  information, etc.—
whenever that item has a particular constellation of  properties that we consider valuable. For 
instance: if  someone knows something, that implies that it’s true and truth is something we 
value in a belief; what’s more, it implies that the fact that they believe this truth is somehow 
non-accidentally related to the truth itself, and again this connection between our beliefs and 
the world is valuable; and so on. And justification is no different. The debate between 
internalists and externalists is a debate about which valuable properties a belief  must have in 
order to count as justified. Both sides, I think, agree that the properties the other side requires 
are valuable—indeed, some internalists will appeal to the value of  having true beliefs when 
they argue that a justified belief  must be part of  a coherent set of  beliefs, pointing out that 
only if  the set of  beliefs is coherent could all of  them be true. They just disagree about which 
count for justification. As Srinivasan says herself, it would surely be better for each of  the 
individuals from above who reliably detected the classism, misogyny, and racism that they 
experienced to be able to say, moreover, what it was that made their experience classist or 
misogynist or racist; to be able to pick out the features of  it on which they based their belief, 
and to know why those features support the conclusion they came to. Once we see this, we 
can also see why the internalist’s notion of  justification, and the valuable features that it 
requires of  a belief, are also crucial for the radical project to which Srinivasan wishes to 
recruit externalism. 
Return again to the individual experiencing classist behaviour at an Oxford college. We 
suppose that he has a reliable mechanism for detecting classism and forms his belief  on this 
basis. We also suppose that he isn’t aware of  this mechanism: he isn’t aware of  how it works 
or what features of  a situation it responds to; he isn’t aware of  its reliability. While it certainly 
speaks in favour of  his belief  that it is formed in this way, we would surely not feel that our 
radical project were complete if  all judgments about classism, racism, or ableism, misogyny or 
sexism, homophobia or transphobia were of  this sort. When we raise consciousness about 
these oppressions and prejudices, we do not wish only that people form beliefs about them 
that are justified by the externalist’s lights. We want people to understand what is racist about 
what they experience; what it is that the reliable mechanism is picking up. If  all we wanted 
was externally justified belief, testimony from a reliable source would suffice. It would be 
enough for a racism guru to whisper in a person’s ear each time they experience it or witness 
it. But, as the tradition of  radical pedagogy has surely convinced us, understanding for 
ourselves the way our social world is structured is more valuable than simply knowing it on 
the basis of  expert testimony. What we want over and above reliability are the things that the 
internalist’s account of  justification demands: awareness of  the evidence; awareness of  why it 
is evidence for the belief; understanding of  the phenomenon that our belief  concerns. 
Of  course, you might reply that this tells in favour not of  retaining both the externalist and 
the internalist concepts of  justification but instead of  retaining the externalist one, while 
adding also a concept that is essentially the conjunction of  the externalist and internalist one. 
After all, what our argument in the previous paragraph shows, if  anything, is the political 
usefulness of  a concept that holds of  a belief  if  both the internalist and externalist accounts 
are satisfied: the belief  is formed reliably, and you’re aware of  that. That is, what the 
internalist demands is what we want only after what the externalist demands is already in 
place. If  this were the only consideration in favour of  the internalist concept, that might be 
true. But when we combine this argument with the arguments above in favour of  the 
internalist concept, it is clear that what is needed is the internalist concept and the externalist 
one; and with both of  those in hand, we can conjoin them when we need to speak of  the goal 
of  raising consciousness. 
What goes for justification here may well go for other concepts, such as knowledge and 
rationality. In general, when philosophers apply the method of  conceptual analysis to 
positively valenced normative concepts in epistemology or other fields—justification, 
knowledge, art, rational, reasonable, moral, prudential, etc.—their analyses are usually 
valuable not because they trace the precise contours of  the single concept to which we’ve all 
been referring with these words, but because in attempting to reveal those contours, they’ve 
enumerated valuable features of  whatever the sort of  thing is to which the concept applies. As 
in the case of  justification, then, it might well be that when we do this, we reveal that there are 
a number of  ways of  collecting those features together to define concepts that are practically 
or politically useful. Just like the concept of  justification, other normative concepts may well 
end up splitting into many versions.
